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7.  Saving Gotham: fighting corruption 
in New York City’s property tax 
system1*
Paul Lagunes and Rongyao Huang
The Department of Finance collects vital revenue for the City of New 
York. One of its major responsibilities is determining the value of 
more than one million properties spread across the city’s five boroughs 
(NYC Finance 2014). To accomplish this task Finance’s Real Property 
Assessment Unit relies on property tax assessors.
Property tax assessors are front- line bureaucrats responsible for deter-
mining the rate at which property owners should be taxed. They perform 
three important tasks: First, property tax assessors ensure that properties 
are assigned to the appropriate tax categories; second, they verify that the 
characteristics of both building and land are correct; and third, they value 
properties in accordance with the existing guidelines (NYC Finance 2014).
The role that property tax assessors play in New York City’s public 
administration supports the thesis that bureaucrats often have considera-
ble bearing on citizen’s lives (Weber 1958; Wilson 1978; Lipsky 1980; Woll 
2009). In carrying out their responsibilities, they have access to privileged 
information and wield broad discretionary powers, which place them at 
an advantage vis- à- vis the voting public (Dodd and Schott 1979; Ferejohn 
1999; Rose- Ackerman 1999; Stiglitz 2002).
The information asymmetry that gives bureaucrats, in general, and 
property tax assessors, in particular, relative power over the citizenry 
can lead to abuse. It is an institutional flaw that a free and active press 
(Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin 2006: 188; Schiffrin 2014), independent 
* We would like to thank Nicola Bonucci and Gautam Nair for their useful 
comments to an early draft of this chapter. Participants at the Conference on 
Grand and Petty Corruption in Developing States at Yale also made suggestions 
that guided our revisions. Finally, we are especially thankful that Milica Koscica, 
Lise Martina and Jennifer Rodgers were willing to provide detailed edits to an 
advanced draft of our work. Any remaining mistakes are our own.
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accounting offices (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999: 24), freedom of 
information procedures (Ackerman and Sandoval- Ballesteros 2006: 93; 
Banisar 2006), and anti- corruption agencies endeavor to correct (Winslow 
and Burke 1993; Manion 2004). Still, the information asymmetry is suf-
ficiently entrenched that bureaucrats continue to find opportunities to 
abuse their power. To illustrate, we provide a case study that examines a 
scandal involving New York City property tax assessors.1
In February of 2002, shortly after Mayor Michael Bloomberg first took 
office, federal prosecutors arrested 18 current and former tax assessors. 
They were charged with participating in an over- three- decades- old cor-
ruption scheme that involved more than 500 properties and cost the city 
an estimated $40 million in revenue a year (Bagli and Rashbaum 2002b). 
The total loss amounted to approximately one billion dollars (Committee 
on Real Property Taxation 2002: 57–8).
Mayor Bloomberg captured the case’s significance by referring to it 
as the ‘largest and most damaging corruption scheme ever conducted 
within the city’ (Seifman 2004). A spokesman for the New York City 
Department of Investigation (DOI) went so far as to state that it knew of 
no larger municipal fraud case in US history (Mcgurk 2002). If these asser-
tions are correct, then this property tax assessment scheme had a greater 
negative impact on the city than the 1970s affair involving corruption in 
the police and buildings departments (for further details refer to: Knapp 
Commission 1973; Maas 1973; Gardiner and Lyman 1978); the 1986 
Democratic party machine fiasco (Newfield and Barrett 1988); and the 
1994 ‘Dirty Thirty’ case of drug dealing cops (Treaster 1994; Anechiarico 
and Jacobs 1996: 164–70).
In any case, this study is the first scholarly effort to examine corrup-
tion in New York City’s property tax system. We interviewed Charles 
V.  Bagli, a veteran New York Times reporter who has covered the 
intersection of politics and real estate since 1987.2 We also spoke with 
 1 There are those who view case studies as beset by a degree- of- freedom 
problem and as vulnerable to selection bias (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 
119–20, 128; McKeown 1999; Geddes 2006: 89). Although we acknowledge the 
method’s limitations, we also view case studies as a useful tool for identifying test-
able hypotheses and exploring the intricacies of extreme cases (Van Evera 1997: 
55; Sambanis 2004: 260; George and Bennett 2005: 19). In this chapter, we use 
the case study approach to achieve the latter objective, but also to motivate future 
empirical work.
 2 Charles V. Bagli is the author of, Other People’s Money, a book that details 
the dynamics that led to the recent US real estate meltdown. Bagli first caught 
wind of the problem in the City’s Property Assessment Office thanks to an anony-
mous call. He wrote over 12 news articles on the topic.
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Sharon  L.  McCarthy, one of the three prosecutors in the criminal case 
resulting from the tax assessor scandal.3 In addition to the in- person 
interviews, we corresponded with Rose Gill Hearn.4 Between 2002 and 
2013, Gill Hearn served as DOI Commissioner. Prior to her appoint-
ment at DOI, Gill Hearn was a federal prosecutor for ten years in the 
US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. Finally, to 
complement the perspectives gathered through direct communications, we 
studied government reports, news articles, legal documents in the public 
domain, and transcripts from the hearings held by the New York State 
Assembly Standing Committee on Real Property Taxation.
Part I reviews key conceptual issues in the study of corruption. In this 
section we address questions such as: What are the institutional structures 
that sustain bureaucratic corruption? How are corruption and inefficiency 
related, and why do anti- corruption agencies tend to target both phenom-
ena? What distinguishes New York City’s Department of Investigation 
from other such agencies, and what do we know about this particular 
agency’s history, statutory powers, legal obligations, institutional capacity 
and track record? Part II introduces the reader to the structure of urban 
property taxation. Part III is the heart of the chapter. There we provide 
a close examination of the 2002 corruption scandal. Finally, we conclude 
with a summary and a brief description of a collaborative research project 
with DOI. This partnership is ongoing and should serve to evaluate dis-
tinct anti- corruption mechanisms through a randomized control trial.
I.  A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO URBAN 
CORRUPTION
There is much that the voting public, and even elected and appointed 
officials, do not know about the workings of government and the bureauc-
racy. To some extent, their ignorance is justified. Elected and appointed 
officials often hold vast responsibilities and are, thus, personally incapable 
of overseeing the work of every agent under their charge. Similarly, the 
electorate dedicates a majority of its time to private, non- governmental 
 3 Sharon L. McCarthy is a partner at the law firm Kostelanetz & Fink, LLP. She 
represents individuals and corporations in civil and white- collar criminal litigation 
and tax controversies and trials. Before rejoining the private sector in 2006, she served 
for 12 years in the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.
 4 Rose Gill Hearn is a Principal at Bloomberg Associates, which is a pro- bono 
consulting group that advises city governments in the United States and around 
the world on governance, economic and other issues.
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affairs. When citizens do engage their government as individuals peti-
tioning for assistance, they are often confused and repelled by legal and 
procedural complexities. This is not to say that every citizen petition is 
just; however, democracy is founded on the idea that government serves 
society. The members of the voting public are government officials’ de jure 
principals, and government officials are reminded of the voting public’s 
supremacy on Election Day. In other words, an electoral connection exists 
between the citizenry and the officials who populate government, but the 
connecting thread becomes thinner the deeper it pierces into the layers of 
public administration. An example from local government illustrates this 
point.
Citizens elect a mayor. The mayor is the city government’s highest- 
ranking executive and by extension most bureaucrats’ de facto principal. If 
the mayor is interested in running for re- election or higher office, she faces 
institutional incentives to serve the public. These same career incentives 
might reasonably motivate the mayor to appoint cabinet members who 
seem willing and capable of serving the citizenry, and yet these appointed 
high- level officials are two steps removed from the ballot box. Being 
invited to serve as the secretary of a local ministry or department hinges 
on the electorate’s choice of mayor, and on the elected mayor’s choice of 
close collaborators.
Following the mayor’s example, the top leadership of city government 
fills select positions with agents of their choosing. These appointed offi-
cials, however, generally rely on the existing corps of lower- level officials 
to carry out the lion’s share of operations. This dynamic presents an 
advantage: a level of continuity is ensured from one mayoral administra-
tion to the next. Everything does not stop when the outgoing mayor and 
her close collaborators pack their bags, and the incoming mayor and her 
staff find their way around city hall. From the standpoint of democratic 
accountability, however, this setup poses two significant challenges. First, 
the officials who join government in the wake of an election often depend 
on the experience and technical knowledge of bureaucrats. Second, these 
bureaucrats are at minimum three degrees removed from the power of the 
ballot box, and are, therefore, significantly less sensitive to the interests of 
the voting public.
Being removed from the electorate grants bureaucrats considerable 
discretion, and this discretionary power is subject to abuse. However, 
influence over a state activity, such as deciding whether a property owner 
receives an illegitimate tax cut, is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for corruption. Other factors, including personal values, prevailing 
social norms, job satisfaction, probability of detection, and severity of the 
penalty, help determine whether an official becomes corrupt.
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A bureaucrat who values personal integrity may avoid acting corruptly 
for fear of incurring a psychological penalty in the form of guilt. The likeli-
hood that a bureaucrat will be corrupt also depends on the bureaucrat’s 
expectations regarding the behavior of others. If corruption is prevalent, 
she can hide her malfeasance within the mix of other corrupt acts. Job 
satisfaction, driven in large part by remuneration, is another variable 
of potential interest. A competitive public sector wage may reduce the 
probability that a bureaucrat will participate in corruption by eliminat-
ing her incentive to supplement an inadequate salary with illegal rents. 
Additionally, given the employment alternatives in the labor market, a 
competitive public sector wage raises a bureaucrat’s opportunity costs of 
losing her current job in government because of malfeasance. However, 
the idea of losing a public sector job or being penalized in some other way 
for corruption depends on the probability of detection, and corruption 
detection is anything but a simple endeavor.
Corruption is difficult to identify, in part, because it is often confused 
with inefficiency, a seemingly lesser ill. Crucially, corruption and inef-
ficiency are related pathologies—an institution affected by corruption is 
often also inefficient, and vice versa. Corruption and inefficiency may 
enjoy a mutually reinforcing relationship. For instance, red tape in the 
form of excessive bureaucratic delays creates an incentive for corrupt pay-
ments. Similarly, we assume that corruption breeds an environment where 
bureaucrats are unmotivated to work energetically to advance the govern-
ment’s official, public- oriented goals. After all, corruption is by definition 
an act that places individual interests above those of the collective.
The key difference between the two is that corruption commonly prom-
ises material gain or the avoidance of material loss by at least one of the 
parties involved in a transaction. In contrast, inefficiency implies waste. 
Inefficiency occurs when resources—such as time, energy, or capital—are 
not expended in a manner that most directly furthers an agency’s official 
goals.
Inefficiency may be caused by an agent’s lack of competence, drive, 
or focus, or by an agency’s poor organizational structure. Similar to 
corruption, inefficiency produces suboptimal outcomes from a public 
interest perspective. This is precisely why anti- corruption agencies, 
such as New York City’s Department of Investigation, tend to target 
both phenomena (City of New York 2004). Indeed, DOI is meant to 
promote better management in NYC, whether or not linked to corrupt 
acts (Seidman 1941).
DOI was originally known as the Office of the Commissioners of 
Accounts, and is one of the oldest law enforcement agencies in the United 
States dedicated to fighting corruption (Department of Investigation 
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2014b). It was founded in 1873 to oppose Tammany Hall’s influence 
(Winslow and Burke 1993: 1–4). In this sense, ‘The creation of DOI was 
through a reactive process, as opposed to a proactive process’ (Green 
2013: 12). Be that as it may, by the mid- 1950s, the agency had evolved 
into a strong, nonpartisan watchdog for the municipal government in 
New York City (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996: 76–81; Department of 
Investigation 2014a).
DOI stands today as an independent department supported by an annual 
budget of approximately $22 million and a staff of about 470 members 
(Green 2013: 14; Peters 2014a: 4). The agency employs attorneys, investi-
gators, forensic auditors, computer forensic specialists and administrative 
personnel (Graycar and Villa 2011: 423; Peters 2014b: 2). DOI holds 
significant powers (including the power to subpoena and conduct arrests), 
and is responsible for investigating and referring for criminal prosecu-
tion cases of unethical behavior by local officials, contractors and others 
who receive benefits from or conduct business with the city (Department 
of Investigation 2014b).5 Based on recent data, a vast majority of DOI’s 
investigations appear to focus on New York City’s Housing Authority 
(Dobkin 2014). However, DOI also conducts numerous investigations 
within the Department of Correction, the Department of Buildings, the 
Fire Department and the School Construction Authority, among other 
agencies (ibid.).6 Importantly, a majority of these cases involve a threat 
to the city’s capacity to meet requirements set by legislation (Graycar and 
Villa 2011).
On the question of efficacy, Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) find impor-
tant instances in DOI’s history where it failed to prevent corruption. 
However, Anechiarico and Smith (2008) also note that, ‘serious cases [of 
corruption] have been cut by almost two- thirds in recent years’.7 Other 
metrics reveal that, since 2002, DOI investigations have led to more than 
6,400 arrests and the recovery of more than $500 million (Gill Hearn 2008; 
 5 As described by local statutes, DOI is responsible for ‘the investigation and 
elimination of corrupt or other criminal activity, conflict of interest, unethical 
conduct, misconduct and incompetence (i) by City agencies, (ii) by City officers 
and employees, and (iii) by persons regulated by, doing business with or receiving 
funds directly or indirectly from the City . . .’ (see Mayoral Executive Order No. 16 
for more information).
 6 The Department of Finance in particular is the 12th most investigated 
agency in New York City (Dobkin 2014).
 7 Based on a different sample (in other words, one that is not solely looking at 
‘significant cases’), a reporter applauds DOI’s efforts during Mayor Bloomberg’s 
administration because it made a record 6,773 municipal corruption arrests (Smith 
2013).
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Adams Otis 2013; Department of Investigation 2013).8 These numbers 
are of course noteworthy in absolute terms, but their relative significance 
depends on the unknown quantity of actual corruption events and finan-
cial losses due to corruption. Therefore, given what information we have 
available, the most we are able to say is that DOI’s success in recouping 
hundreds of millions of dollars signals a positive and dutiful effort to fend 
against the theft of public resources. This is an issue that is particularly 
relevant given the topic at hand.
As we discuss at length in Part III, the 2002 corruption scandal 
involving New York City property tax assessors hit soon after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. This is a period during which the city 
faced a $4 billion budget gap (Bagli 2002a). In court, Sharon McCarthy 
argued that the tax assessors involved in the corruption scheme abused 
their power and, ‘in doing so deflated assessments, denying the city of 
certain tax revenue’ (USA v. Marino 2000: 8).9 The prevailing estimate 
is that the city lost a total of approximately one billion dollars over 
the course of more than three decades. This is precisely why Rose Gill 
Hearn (2014), the commissioner of the Department of Investigation 
during Bloomberg’s administration, considers the property tax assess-
ment scheme to be one of the two most costly corruption events in 
the city’s recent history.10 The other significant case involved fraud 
in a payroll modernization project that cost taxpayers more than 
$600 million (Gross 2011; Weiser 2014).
 8 In addition to searching for statistics, we also reviewed multiple news 
articles to see how the media evaluated the level of government integrity during 
Bloomberg’s administration. No single article or quote in The New York Times, 
The Economist or The Wall Street Journal offered a clear and direct assessment. 
Most articles focused on specific events related to the issue (scandals, increased 
oversight, etc.), but none evaluated the overall state of government integrity in 
New York City. However, taken together, the articles paint a picture that the 
Bloomberg administration struggled with several integrity issues, but that it also 
attempted to implement procedures to overcome them.
 9 Agreeing with McCarthy’s assessment, the judge observed that, ‘[the scheme] 
went on for quite a number of years. My problem is’, he continued, ‘we are talking 
about $4.1 million in bribes. We are not talking about a small amount. I don’t 
accept the suggestion that there was no substantial loss. I mean, I cannot believe 
that someone would pay $4.1 million unless he was getting something substantial 
in return’ (USA v. Marino 2000a: 17).
10 In the interviewee’s own words: ‘The only other case that comes to mind 
as comparable in relation to its direct monetary impact is the CityTime case, 
which we also investigated and brought to a successful conclusion with the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York’ (Gill Hearn 2014).
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II. MUNICIPAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT
Property taxation has been the major source of tax revenue for US munici-
palities since the seventeenth century (Netzer 1966: 3). It is also an impor-
tant source of local government revenue in Britain, Ireland, South Africa, 
Australia, and New Zealand (11). But our focus is on the United States, 
where state and local governments collected an estimated $488 billion 
in property taxes in 2013 (US Census Bureau 2013). This considerable 
amount represents more than a third of all state and local government 
revenue for that year (Entrikin 2014: 289).
In New York City, property taxes account for approximately 
$18.4 billion of its budget, or about 40 percent of all the city tax revenue 
collected in fiscal year 2013 (Office of Management and Budget 2014). It 
is the city’s single largest and most stable source of funding. The property 
tax is, moreover, a source of revenue that has been growing since fiscal 
year 2002, a fact that we highlight in Figure 7.1, where the x- axis stands 
for fiscal year and the y- axis represents the adopted tax revenue budget in 
million US dollars. The light grey ribbon shows the property tax revenue 
from 2002 to 2014; the dark grey ribbon shows all other tax revenue. 




















































Figure 7.1 The importance of property tax revenue for New York City
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The Department of Finance (DOF) is responsible for collecting 
 property  taxes in New York City. As noted in the introduction, 
the task  is one of monumental proportions. In fact, as Figure 7.2 
reveals, the number of properties in New York City has been growing 
rapidly since fiscal  year 2002, and now exceeds one million (NYC 
Finance 2013).
DOF has an office known as Real Property Assessments. This 
is the specific unit that assesses11 the value of properties in the 
city, issues Notices of Assessment to taxpayers, and collects prop-
erty taxes  from  taxpayers  (NYC Finance 2014). The Real Property 
Assessments Unit employs approximately 119 assessors and has offices 
in each of New  York City’s five boroughs. Of the five boroughs, as 
Figure 7.3 shows, Manhattan accounts for the largest taxable value. 
11 The term ‘assessment’ refers to the, ‘whole statutory mode of imposing the 
[property tax]. It embraces all the proceedings for raising money by the exercise 
of the power of taxation from the inception to the conclusion of the proceedings’ 
















































Note: The graph includes partially taxable and fully taxable properties. It excludes fully 
exempt properties.
Figure 7.2 Number of taxable properties in NYC
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Moreover, the  borough’s taxable value has been growing rapidly since 
fiscal year 2002.
Another aspect of the New York City property tax system that merits 
attention is its subdivision by property types. Before 1981, New York 
City’s properties were divided into ten non- housing tax classes (Netzer 
et al. 1980: I–20). It was a complex system with even greater room for 
bureaucratic discretion. In particular, the rates of tax for each class were 
determined by assessors in combination with the Tax Commission and 
the courts (I–2). Then, in 1981, the New York State legislature enacted 
S7000A. This statute created a system with four classes of property, each 
class being taxed on a different share of its market value. Following is a 
description of each tax class:
 ● Class 1 encompasses one- to three- unit residential properties.
 ● Class 2 refers to residential properties with more than 3 units, 
including cooperatives and condominiums.
 ● Class 3 is meant for utility company equipment and special franchise 
properties.




















































































Figure 7.3 Property taxable billable assessments by Borough
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Figure 7.4 compares the tax levy for the four tax classes. The data reveal 
that, across all of New York City, tax class 4 has the largest share of tax 
collections among the tax classes.
All properties—regardless of the tax class or borough they belong 
to—are assessed on a yearly basis. The assessment process follows a 
set timeline. On 5 January, DOF determines the taxable status of each 
parcel of real property in New York City. Ten days later, on 15 January, 
DOF makes public the tentative assessed values for every parcel of real 
property. It does so by mailing a Notice of Assessment to every property 
owner, but also by publishing the Tentative Tax Roll. The Tentative Tax 
Roll is open for public inspection from 16 January to 16 March of each 
year. Property owners who disagree with DOF’s assessment may file an 
appeal with the Tax Commission. After the Tentative Tax Roll is closed 
to public inspection and after DOF and the Tax Commission have made 
their corrections, the annual roll is made final on 25 May. Then, on 1 July, 
a new fiscal year begins.
Thus far we have described property taxation as it is supposed to work. 
However, Diane B. Paul, a scholar who has written about property taxa-
tion in the U.S. describes the activity as one of ‘the most corrupt of urban 









































































Figure 7.4 Tax levy by tax class
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[T]he actual work of valuing property is done by ‘street level bureaucrats’ over 
whom there is generally little effective supervision. The decisions made by 
urban assessors are sometimes of great importance to taxpayers, particularly 
owners of apartment buildings and commercial and industrial property, and it 
is precisely for these kinds of property that well- defined standards of assessment 
are lacking. Assessing, like police work, is both discretionary and subjective, 
combining constant temptation with minimal likelihood of exposure . . . (8).
This last problem—specifically, imperfect monitoring in taxation—is ana-
lyzed by Das- Gupta and Mookherjee (1998) and by Flatters and Macleod 
(1995). Moreover, it is a problem that local news coverage has recently 
exposed in Los Angeles (Dolan 2013), Cayahoga County (Caniglia 2013), 
and Cook County (Meisner 2013).
In summary, property tax assessment is a vital but imperfectly moni-
tored government activity that relies on bureaucratic discretion. This is 
true even for agencies that have come to rely on new technology, such as 
computer modeling. Data analytics allows government auditors to iden-
tify individuals or firms who are paying less in taxes compared to others 
showing similar characteristics. During David Frankel’s tenure as com-
missioner, DOF created the Data Intelligence Group in order to improve 
the efficiency of its auditing activities (Goldsmith 2014). In spite of these 
efforts, however, the property tax system continues to rely on assessors to 
conduct field inspections and interpret property tax laws. Herein lies the 
risk.
III. THE 2002 PROPERTY TAX SCANDAL
Large and small property owners may seek relief from property taxes by 
hiring consultants. Tax consultants are middlemen whose compensation 
often comes in the form of a fraction (typically, 30 to 50 percent) of the tax 
savings obtained for a property owner (Entrikin 2014: 300). Many prop-
erty tax consultants follow ethical and professional standards, but there 
are also those who rely on questionable methods to influence tax officials. 
This explains why tax consultants are sometimes painted in a negative 
light as bureaucratic lobbyists. As stated by a New York City real estate 
executive, ‘We pay lobbyists. That’s the system we live in. Sometimes you 
get one that’s crooked’ (Rashbaum and Bagli 2002).
Enter Albert Schussler. After 30 years of working as a tax assessor for 
the City of New York, Schussler left government in 1967 to begin a career 
as a private sector consultant (Bagli and Rashbaum 2002b; Entrikin 
2014:  318). Schussler aimed to capitalize on his knowledge about and 
contacts within the real estate industry. For the next 35 years, he charged 
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property owners substantial fees12 in exchange for contriving to reduce 
their property taxes.13
In 2002, authorities accused Schussler of masterminding a massive 
corruption scheme (US District Court 2002). According to the indict-
ment, Schussler had paid a total of $10 million in bribes so that tax 
assessors would undervalue some 562 properties (ibid.).14 The bribes 
ranged from expensive dinners to thousands of dollars in cash pay-
ments. In exchange, assessors—whose official salaries ranged from 
$46,000 to $68,000 a year15—agreed to show Schussler their valuations 
before assessments were made public (Newman 2002: 73). Schussler 
would then provide a counter- assessment. In some cases, assessments 
dropped. In other cases, they stayed the same as the previous year or did 
not increase as much as they should have under normal circumstances 
(ibid.).16
When the scandal hit, the President of the Real Estate Board of 
New  York responded by focusing the blame on the indicted tax asses-
sors, and by defending the reputation of the city’s real estate industry 
(Committee on Real Property Taxation 2002: 106).17 This is an indus-
try with significant political influence in the city (Bagli 2014; Craig, 
Raushbaum and Kaplan 2014), and yet the interests of its members are not 
always aligned. As a case in point, the corruption scheme described here 
hurt many more landlords than it helped. This explains why nearly 1,000 
12 According to one report, Albert Schussler charged his customers a flat 
retainer of $200,000 to $400,000 (Bagli and Rashbaum 2002b).
13 Schussler’s influence grew to the point that he became an active figure in 
the Real Estate Board of New York. He also purchased and managed properties, 
including the iconic Ansonia Hotel (US District Court 2002 4; Bagli 2003a).
14 The exact number of undervalued properties is unclear. One report, for 
example, has the number at 545 (Bagli 2002b).
15 During the State Assembly hearings the union representative for tax 
assessors suggested that, ‘Assessors should be better compensated and receive 
financial incentives for obtaining professional designations and higher education’ 
(Committee on Real Property Taxation 2002: 73).
16 In alphabetical order and according to news reports, a few of the real estate 
firms whose property taxes were lowered as a result of Schussler’s intervention 
were: Cohen Brothers Realty, Glenwood Management, Helmsley Spear, Jack 
Resnick and Sons, Lefferts- Fore and SL Green Realty (Danis 2002; Bagli 2002a; 
Bagli and Rashbaum 2002a; Bagli 2002c).
17 ‘As an industry’, the President of the Real Estate Board asserted, ‘we have a 
proud history of [. . .] contributing our time, energy, and money to causes, cultural, 
social, educational, enhancing the quality of life and the image of our City around 
the world, despite the baseless accusations of reckless editorials who have com-
mented on this episode’ (Committee on Real Property Taxation 2002: 106).
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property owners sued the city on the basis that they had been forced to pay 
higher taxes to make up for the losses caused by tax assessor corruption 
(Bagli 2002e; Bagli 2003b).
In spite of the mounting pressure due to the lawsuits and media 
 coverage, not a single property owner was criminally charged. Reflecting 
on this outcome, one of the prosecutors expressed the following 
statement:
[Y]ou’d love to follow the rainbow to its very end, and get every single person 
along the way who has been committing crimes, but, unfortunately, it’s not 
possible. You need evidence, and in a case like this the best way to get evidence 
is from people who dealt directly with the property owners. The person who 
dealt directly with the property owners is Albert Schussler, and he passed 
away, and, so [we lost the] ability to go after anyone else. And, you know, [. . .] 
there was no clear evidence that any of the property owners knew that Albert 
Schussler was paying bribes. So, none of the Tax Assessors, at least none of the 
witnesses that we worked with, had ever met directly with the property owners 
(McCarthy 2014).
In other words, by relying on a tax consultant property owners managed 
to advance their financial interests, while maintaining a safe distance from 
the actual assessment process.
Now, in order to better comprehend the tax scheme itself it is worth 
reviewing what we know about a tax assessor who served as Schussler’s 
closest collaborator, Joseph Marino. A reporter describes Marino as a 
‘real tough guy . . . [often] smoking Camel cigarettes, and when he did 
come in the office he’d snap his fingers, and there was this other guy who 
didn’t go out into the field anymore because he’d gotten beat up once, 
he’d bring him over his cup of espresso’ (Bagli 2014). Standing before a 
judge, Marino admitted that he received as much as $4.1 million in bribes 
from Schussler between 1991 and 1997 (USA v. Marino 2000: 13). These 
bribe payments flowed as checks from Schussler’s firm to that of one 
of Marino’s relatives. The latter then declared the payments as taxable 
income (ibid.).
In terms of the number of officials implicated, around 40 percent of 
the city’s 38 Manhattan assessors were directly involved in the corrup-
tion scheme (Bagli and Rashbaum 2002b). Two more officials, Roberta 
C. Hand and Aldo Macina, were arrested a year later (Friedman 2003; 
Saulny 2003).
There is much we can also learn from studying the information con-
tained in the original indictment (see: U.S. District Court 2002). Our 
review of the bribes paid to tax assessors in Manhattan between 1997 
and 2002 shows that corruption was a particular risk in the months of 
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December and April—that is, before the tentative and final tax rolls were 
published. Figure 7.5 illustrates our finding. The x- axis represents months 
in a year (15January, 25February, and so on) and the y- axis captures 
bribe data in US dollars. The height of a bar signals the total amount of 
bribes paid on a given month over the course of five years. Each colored 
block in a bar is a bribe payment. The block’s tone and size signals the 
bribe’s magnitude.
The corruption scheme’s proportions are evident when examining the 
geographical area affected, the number of tax assessors involved, and 
the amount of bribes paid and tax revenue lost. Reports show that the 
scheme extended from Lower Manhattan through the Upper East Side 
to Harlem. It also covered the area between West 41st Street and West 
96th Street, west of Eighth Avenue/Central Park West (Bagli 2002a; Bagli 
and Rashbaum 2002a). The following map pinpoints a partial sample 
(N5198) of these properties.
Finally, we turn to the question of bribes and revenue. Figure 7.7 sum-
marizes key information about the known illicit payments made to 16 of 
the assessors implicated in the corruption scheme. The x- axis represents 













































Note: The first number represents the total amount of bribes paid; the second number in 
parenthesis represents the number of bribe payments.
Figure 7.5 Bribe payments by month
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most corrupt assessor is shown at the top, and the least corrupt is shown 
at the bottom. The size of a bar signals the total amount of bribes received 
between 1997 and 2002. Each shaded block in a bar is one bribe payment. 
The block’s tone and size signals the bribe’s magnitude. The numbers 
shown with each bar are: (1) the average amount of bribes, and (2) the 
number of bribes recorded for each assessor. The top three assessors in 
terms of total amount of bribes received are Joseph Iovino, Vatchara 
Vachiraprapun, and Howard Habler. Figure 7.8 suggests a correlation 
between hierarchy and corrupt returns: the higher the position, the greater 
the bribes.
On the question of revenue, it is difficult to calculate exactly how much 
was lost because of corruption. That said, prosecutors estimated that the 
Note: * The map includes 198 properties with their values assessed Fiscal Year 2009.
Figure 7.6 Map: properties involved in the 2002 scandal
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Note: The first number represents the total amount of bribes paid; the second number 
represents the number of bribe payments.
Figure 7.7 Bribe payments by defendant






















Figure 7.8 Bribe by position in the bureaucracy’s hierarchy
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scheme cost the city $40 million a year in tax income, or $160 million 
between 1997 and 2002 (Bagli 2002d). Considering that the scheme went 
on for approximately 35 years, the city may have lost up to one billion 
dollars (Committee on Real Property Taxation 2002: 57–8).
As the engineer of the corruption scheme, Schussler risked spending 25 
years in prison (Miller 2003). However, shortly before his trial, in early 
2003, the tax- assessor- turned- consultant suffered a lethal stroke at the 
age of 85 (Bagli 2003a). ‘So we had given [Schussler] a deadline’, the inter-
viewed prosecutor explained, ‘in which to tell us whether he was going to 
proceed to trial, or enter a guilty plea. And he died that day, the day that 
we were expecting his answer. [. . .] I was shocked when he died, of course. 
I was shocked. He seemed to be in fine health. I didn’t have any concerns 
about his health; his lawyers didn’t raise any health concerns. But I 
imagine he was under quite a bit of stress’ (McCarthy 2014).18 Needless to 
say, Schussler’s passing was an important setback for the prosecution—
one that perhaps could have been avoided had the corruption scheme been 
detected sooner. On the subject of timing, Mayor Bloomberg complained 
that fraud in property taxation had ‘gone on through six mayors, innu-
merable commissioners of finance’ (Danis 2002).
There had been earlier signs. A former president of the city’s Tax 
Commission, David Goldstein, claimed to have written an urgent letter 
in 1993 to DOI alerting it to possible corruption in the tax assessor’s 
office. The letter apparently made explicit references to Albert Schussler 
and one of his associates, Thomas McArdle (Bagli 2002f). Aware of 
these suspicions, DOI launched a focused investigation into the ques-
tion of  corruption in property tax assessment around 1997. As part of its 
investigation, DOI twice inserted undercover agents into the Manhattan 
18 Bagli (2014) tells the following story to suggest that Schussler’s death was 
surprising:
 At one point, while I’m writing this story, I’m waiting outside [the courthouse] and 
[Schussler] comes out and his lawyer, whom I’d gotten to know, comes over to me 
and says, ‘Would you like to meet Mr. Schussler?’ And I was kind of surprised . . . 
So he came over, and we shook hands, and he congratulated me on my reporting. 
Kind of weird. So, ultimately, at a certain point I knew that he was going [to court] 
in January, I forget whether it was . . . it must have been January of 2003, he was 
supposed to go in to talk to the US prosecutor, and he was going to Florida for 
the holidays. Upon his return he was scheduled for a meeting. The night before the 
meeting he died. This shook the hell out of his lawyer, as well as everybody else. 
You began to hear and think of those stories of Russian spies and getting stabbed 
underneath a bridge in London with an umbrella. . . . Well, I know that when I 
talked to his lawyer the next day, he was really shaken [sic]. And it sort of took the 
wind out of the sails because the hope or the expectation was that he was going to 
name names.
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 property valuations unit (Rashbaum and Bagli 2002). However, DOI’s 
search faced three significant obstacles:
 ● The city’s tax assessors worked as a tightly knit group, which some 
described as ‘clannish’ and akin to ‘an organized crime family’ 
(ibid.).
 ● The assessment process was fraught with complexities that helped 
hide the corruption.19
 ● One of DOI’s undercover agents, Nancy Sidaross, leaked confiden-
tial information about the investigation to the assessors (Seifman 
2002).
In spite of these significant hurdles, a news article claims that DOI had a 
lucky break while conducting an interview about corruption allegations 
involving Brooklyn assessors. The interviewee misunderstood his ques-
tioners and began disclosing information about corruption in the Real 
Property Assessment’s Manhattan office (Rashbaum and Bagli 2002). 
This helped authorities close in on Joseph Marino.
When Marino pleaded guilty in September of 2000, Albert Schussler 
dropped out of the corruption scheme. In July of 2001, however, Alan 
Edelstein, age 52, took Schussler’s place in a revived version of the opera-
tion (2002f). Evidently, Edelstein did not realize that the investigation 
was ongoing. In fact, by this point, investigators had the cooperation of 
Marino and two other individuals—specifically, Thomas and Stephen 
McArdle—who also participated in the corruption scheme (Bagli 2002f). 
Stephen McCardle, in particular, was crucial, because, in cooperating 
with the investigation, later recorded tax assessors’ descriptions of their 
involvement in the tax scheme (McCarthy 2014).
In the end, the accumulated evidence enabled authorities to prosecute 
a total of 20 individuals. It also made it possible for authorities to seize 
$17,597,842 of Schussler’s ill- gotten assets (Gearty 2004; Gill Hearn 
2004). This offered a degree of closure to a major case of urban fraud. 
Some might even see these actions by the authorities as inhibiting a similar 
corruption scheme from arising in the future. However, the fact that not 
everyone who benefited from Schussler’s shady operations was disciplined 
might have generated a moral hazard problem. Property tax assessment 
19 In the words of a law enforcement official, ‘It’s one thing to have the allega-
tions. But the target can always come back and say, “This is why we ranked this 
building at a lower assessment than the guy next door”’ (Rashbaum and Bagli 
2002).
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remains a complicated process with significant financial implications 
in the hands of modestly paid bureaucrats. Gotham, thus, needs DOI’s 
unceasing vigilance.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH AGENDA
In this chapter we examined a corruption scandal in New York City’s 
recent history. The case involved a fraudulent scheme in property tax 
assessment that lasted over three decades and may have cost the city as 
much as one billion dollars in revenue. Approximately 40 percent of the 
city’s Manhattan assessors were directly implicated. Even global news 
agencies—from The New York Times to The Guardian—reported on the 
story, and yet only a short period after the criminal case ended few people 
seem to remember the event.
Even fewer realize that a similar scheme had been uncovered in 
California a few decades before (Phelan 1966). Albert Schussler’s coun-
terpart in that earlier scheme was James C. Tooke. Like Schussler, Tooke 
was a former tax assessor turned consultant who knew how to grease the 
wheels of bureaucracy. Another parallel between the cases is that not a 
single individual or firm that hired Tooke was charged with wrongdoing 
or complicity. Thus, there appears to exist a pattern, and scholars writing 
on administrative corruption summarize that pattern with the following: 
‘Delinquent taxpayers are practically never prosecuted’ (Flatters and 
Macleod 1995: 398).
However, beyond the question of prosecution, as researchers, what we 
are most interested in is corruption prevention. It is, thus, worth reviewing 
some of the reforms that DOF implemented after the 2002 scandal. These 
reforms included:
 ● Reducing the amount of contact between assessors and property 
owners.
 ● Engaging in random assessment reviews, and restructuring the 
Internal Audit and Department Advocate’s Units.
 ● Requiring that assessors file financial disclosure forms.
 ● Implementing new technology to enhance the assessment process 
(NYC Finance 2004).
In spite of these innovations, however, there have been new, if sporadic, 
reports of property tax evasion (Bagli 2012; Gonzalez 2014). Corruption 
hazards continue to exist in the city’s tax system; however, DOI has 
reaffirmed its commitment to effective monitoring. As a sign of this 
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 commitment, the agency opened itself up to a collaborative research 
project that tests ways to curb corruption in property taxation.
As was noted earlier, according to an independent assessment, DOI has 
reduced serious cases of corruption by almost two- thirds in recent years 
(Anechiarico and Smith 2008: 76). This finding, nonetheless, is based 
on observational data and is, therefore, vulnerable to certain forms of 
measurement bias. Indeed, given the nature of the data, we are unable to 
distinguish whether the reduction in cases of corruption is explained by 
DOI’s enhanced efforts or some other factor, such as inhibited corruption 
reporting or heightened sophistication among those who partake in cor-
ruption. But even if we grant that DOI has raised the level of government 
integrity in New York City, the existing data does not help us evaluate the 
effectiveness across DOI’s different anti- corruption strategies. Therefore, 
we conducted a randomized control trial (or RCT) in order to answer two 
questions. First, does monitoring by DOI help ensure that property assess-
ments are conducted with greater integrity and efficiency? Second, which 
is more effective in ensuring that property assessments are performed in an 
honest and efficient manner: proactive or reactive audits?
RCTs are a powerful tool for advancing scientific knowledge, especially 
when applied to real- world situations. As case in point, Lawrence Sherman 
and coauthors (1995) conducted an RCT on deterrence in criminal justice. 
Similarly, in 2009, criminologists from Temple University collaborated 
with the city of Philadelphia in order to conduct an RCT that tested the 
effectiveness of foot patrols in fighting crime. Their finding that patrolling 
city blocks by foot reduces violent crime by 23 percent overturned conven-
tional views about policing (Ratcliffe et al. 2011).
In the realm of corruption studies, RCTs are also increasingly popular 
(Peisakhin 2011). For instance, in Indonesia, Ben Olken (2007) tested 
whether grassroots versus centralized monitoring is more effective in 
reducing corruption. In another study, Ferraz and Finan (2011) analyzed 
data from local corruption audits in Brazil. Their results show that cor-
ruption is less common among mayors seeking re- election. Following 
a similar approach, Lagunes conducted an RCT in Querétaro, one of 
Mexico’s most populous cities. In this study a random sample of con-
struction permit applications were entered into a treatment group. Plan 
Examiners (that is, the low- level officials responsible for reviewing build-
ing permit applications) and the Permits Office Director were made aware 
that an independent anti- corruption auditor was reviewing all the physical 
documentation (for example, title deeds, blue prints, and tax receipts) for 
applications within this group. Simultaneously, these same officials were 
unaware that the auditor was reviewing another set of randomly selected 
applications via the government’s computer network. With implications 
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for law enforcement, the study’s results reveal that monitoring spurs 
greater diligence and stringency among bureaucrats, but only when they 
sense the risk of a top- down sanction.
In this new and independently funded RCT the main hypothesis is that 
the threat of an audit will stimulate local tax assessors to perform their 
duty in a more efficient and honest manner. An additional hypothesis 
is that, compared to the threat of post- hoc or reactive audits, proactive 
monitoring by DOI will have a stronger and positive effect on govern-
ment officials’ behavior. This chapter, however, is not about that RCT, 
which—as of this writing—is in the analysis stage. Instead, this chapter is 
about an extraordinary case of municipal fraud that begs practitioners and 
academics alike to persevere in their effort to prevent corruption.
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